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Abstract
This paper proposes a new method to identify leaders and followers in a network. Prior works use
spatial autoregression models (SARs) which implicitly assume that each individual in the network has
the same peer effects on others. Mechanically, they conclude the key player in the network to be the one
with the highest centrality. However, when some individuals are more influential than others, centrality
may fail to be a good measure. I develop a model that allows for individual-specific endogenous effects
and propose a two-stage LASSO procedure to identify influential individuals in a network. Under an as-
sumption of sparsity: only a subset of individuals (which can increase with sample size n) is influential,
I show that my 2SLSS estimator for individual-specific endogenous effects is consistent and achieves
asymptotic normality. I also develop robust inference including uniformly valid confidence intervals.
These results also carry through to scenarios where the influential individuals are not sparse. I extend
the analysis to allow for multiple types of connections (multiple networks), and I show how to use the
sparse group LASSO to detect which of the multiple connection types is more influential. Simulation
evidence shows that my estimator has good finite sample performance. I further apply my method to
the data in Banerjee et al. (2013) and my proposed procedure is able to identify leaders and effective
networks.
key words: key players, network, endogenous effects, spillovers, high-dimensional models, LASSO,
model selection, robust inference
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1 Introduction
How an individual’s behavior is affected by the behavior of her neighbors in an exogenously given
network is an important research question in applied economics. With the increasing availability of
detailed data documenting connections among individuals, spatial autoregression models (SARs)
have been widely applied in the empirical networks literature to estimate endogenous effects.
In SARs, an individual’s behavior depends on the weighted average of other individuals’ behav-
iors (see Anselin, 1988; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Standard SARs assume that the peer ef-
fects/endogenous effects are the same across individuals in a network. Each individual influences
her neighbors at the same rate regardless of who she is. However, in many contexts, some indi-
viduals are clearly more influential than others. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) finds that
the magnitude of spillovers varies dramatically among workers with different skill levels. Clark and
Loheac (2007) also notes that popular teenagers in a school have much stronger influence on their
classmates’ smoking decisions than their less popular peers.
I propose a novel SAR model which allows for heterogeneous endogenous effects. Each individual in
a network simultaneously generates an outcome that takes into account all her neighbors’ behaviors.
Unlike standard SARs, each individual has an individual-specific effect on her neighbors. As a result,
there are as many coefficients for individual-specific endogenous effects as there are individuals in
the network. To achieve identification, I assume that “truly-influential” individuals only constitute
a small fraction of the total population. In other words, individual-specific coefficients are assumed
to be sparse. This assumption allows me to estimate the model via the least absolute shrinkage
and selection operator (LASSO). The LASSO procedure penalizes the l1 norm for the coefficients
of heterogeneous endogenous effects. The geometry of the l1 norm enforces the sparsity in the
LASSO estimators. If a coefficient is selected by LASSO (i.e. the estimated coefficient is non-
zero), the individual associated with this coefficient can influence all her neighbors at her specific
rate. Otherwise the LASSO estimator will indicate that the individual has no influence on her
neighbors. With some restrictions on the network structures, I show that the LASSO estimates for
heterogeneous endogenous effects have near oracle performance (see Bu¨hlmann and van de Geer,
2011). In other words, the selection of influential individuals is consistent and the convergence rate
of non-zero LASSO estimates is the same as the convergence rate that would have been achieved if
the truly influential individuals were known.
One challenge in my estimation process is the presence of endogeneity in the spatial lag and error
term. As with standard SARs, the dependent variable in my model is used to construct spatial
lags as an independent variable. As a result, the regressors are correlated with the error term and
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estimates would be biased if we were to apply LASSO directly.
First I propose a set of novel instruments to address the endogeneity. Following Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), I express the dependent variable as an infinite sum of functions consisting of exogenous
characteristics and an adjacency matrix. I show that the exogenous characteristics of influential
individuals can be used as instruments for their neighbors. Then I design a two-stage estimation
process for heterogeneous endogenous effects using LASSO at each stage. In the first stage, I
use LASSO to estimate the coefficients for the instruments. These estimated coefficients and
instruments are then used to create a synthetic dependent variable. In the second stage, I replace the
dependent variable in the spatial lags with the synthetic variable to perform the LASSO estimation.
The next challenge is to construct robust confidence intervals for my LASSO type two-stage esti-
mator. As pointed out in Leeb and Potscher (2008), it is impossible to estimate the distribution for
post-model-selection estimators. Consistent model selection by LASSO is only guaranteed when all
non-zero coefficients are large enough to be distinguished from zero in a finite sample (i.e. a condi-
tion usually named “beta-min”). LASSO may fail to select regressors with very small coefficients,
resulting in omitted variable bias in the post LASSO inference.
I propose a bias correction for my two-stage estimator following the recent LASSO inference liter-
ature (see Chernozhukov et al., 2018; Belloni et al., 2015; van de Geer et al., 2014; Javanmard and
Montanari, 2014; Zhang and Zhang, 2011; Zhu, 2018). The idea is to correct the first order bias
and make the estimators independent from the model selection. Heuristically, shrinkage bias due to
the l1 penalty in LASSO can be expressed as a function of the LASSO estimators. Normality can
still be achieved after adjusting for this bias. I show that this strategy also works in my two-stage
estimation process under the presence of spatial errors. I derive the asymptotic normality for my
“de-bias” two-stage LASSO estimator and conduct robust inference including confidence intervals.
My model can be extended to allow for more flexible structures of influencing. One real world
scenario is a network which consists of many local leaders. Local leaders may only influence
individuals within their own cliques/groups but have no influence on individuals outside their
cliques/groups. Influence from local leaders can be represented by a homogenous endogenous
effects. Exogenous effect and homophily within cliques may also be present.
To solve the problem in this scenario, I modify my model by bringing back the classical SAR model.
I assume that there are both local leaders and global leaders in the network. In contrast to local
leaders, global leaders can influence individuals across different cliques. I show that homogeneous
endogenous effects across local leaders, exogenous effects, and correlated effects can be identified
under assumptions similar to those Bramoulle´ et al. (2009). Under a sparsity assumption, the en-
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dogenous effects of global leaders, whose influence remain individual-specific, can also be identified
under the same set of instruments proposed in my main model.
Another real world scenario is the existence of multiple types of connections among individuals.
For example, connections among individuals can be classified as social (e.g. friendship, kinship) or
economic (e.g. lending, employment). In epidemiology, infectious disease can be spread through
air, insects, or direct contact. It is important to identify which networks are more efficient at
transmitting the endogenous effects.
I model different types of connections as multiple networks. I propose the use of sparse group
LASSO to estimate a heterogeneous endogenous effects model with multiple networks. The sparse
group LASSO penalizes both the l1 norm and the l2 norm for each coefficient in each type of
connection and thus selects both the influential individuals and effective types of connections that
generate spillover. I derive the convergence rate and prove the consistency of selection for this
estimator. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to show statistical properties for
sparse group LASSO.
I provide simulation evidence for networks of different sizes and different data generating algorithms.
The empirical coverage of my proposed estimators is close to the nominal level in all scenarios.
Similar results are also found in models with multiple networks and with cliques.
I apply my method to study villagers’ decisions to participate in micro-finance programs in rural
areas of India as in Banerjee et al. (2013). Instead of simulating the contagion process and recon-
structing the data into panel format as in Banerjee et al. (2013), my method allows researchers to
directly analyze cross-sectional data under the standard equilibrium assumptions. Among different
social and economic networks, my method shows that some networks such as “visit go-come” and
“borrow money”, are much more effective at influencing villagers’ decisions than other networks
such as “go to temple together” and “medical help”. I further show that individuals in certain
careers such as agricultural workers, Anganwadi teachers and small business owners are more likely
to influence villagers.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper brings together literature on spatial autoregression model, LASSO and networks.
SARs:
SARs have been widely applied in empirical studies. For instance, they have been used to study
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peer effects in labor productivity (see Mas and Moretti, 2009; Guryan et al., 2009; Bandiera et al.,
2009), smoking behavior among teenagers (see Krauth, 2005; Clark and Loheac, 2007; Nakajima,
2007), educational achievements among different student groups (see Sacerdote, 2001; Neidell and
Waldfogel, 2010), systemic risk in finance (see Bonaldi et al., 2015; Denbee et al., 2015), and the
adoption of new agricultural technologies (see Coelli et al., 2002; Conley and Udry, 2010). My paper
proposes a novel extension of standard SARs that could be used to identify influential individuals in
a given network. My methodology for estimating such a model could easily be adopted in existing
empirical SARs analyses to identify influential individuals who influence their peers productivity,
smoking decisions, or financial holdings.
More specifically, my model extends existing SARs literature by introducing heterogeneous endoge-
nous effects. Until very recently, SARs always assume a constant rate of dependence for endogenous
effects across different individuals. Moreover, row-sum normalization is widely adopted in the esti-
mation, which may further result misspecification under the existence of heterogeneous endogenous
effects. (see Cliff and Ord (1973), the first monograph on the topic, and the later studies, Up-
ton and Fingleton (1985); Anselin (1988); Cressie (1993); Lee and Liu (2010); Lee and Yu (2010);
Jin and Lee (2018)). Recent developments in social interaction literature incorporate individual
characteristics into SARs, essentially allows for a limited degrees of pre-stipulated heterogeneity,
for example, (see Pinkse et al., 2002). In contrast, this paper shows that heterogeneous endoge-
nous effects can be identified from individuals’ outcomes instead of being pre-specified through
individuals’ characteristics. Another article studying individual heterogeneity from random coeffi-
cient aspect is Masten (2018). Masten (2018)’s model assumes each individual has different rate
of receiving the influence while my model assumes each individual has different rate of influencing
her neighbors. The two different models yield two different identification strategies. This paper
contributes to the literature by showing heterogeneous endogenous effects can be directly identified
using cross-sectional data.
To estimate the heterogeneous endogenous effects in my model, I propose a methodology that is
different from standard SARs literature. In classic SARs, there is only one endogenous variable and
hence it is sufficient to identify the model through only one instrument. In my model, the number
of potentially endogenous variables increases as the number of observations increases. As a result,
I propose a set of instruments that contain the same number of instruments as the total number of
individuals. Each instrument is essentially a decomposition from the standard SARs instruments
as in Kelejian and Prucha (1998), Lee (2002), Lee (2003) and Lee (2004).
I show that my model can be combined with SAR model under homogeneous endogenous effects,
exogenous effects and correlated effects. To solve the classical “reflection problem” as in Manski
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(1993), I adopt the same strategy as in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and show that “neighbors’ neighbor”
instruments can be combined with my set of instruments to identify additional structures in the
spillovers.
This paper also contributes to literature that models multiple networks through SARs. In standard
SARs, multiple networks are modeled as higher order spatial lags (see Lee and Liu, 2010). My
model allows each individual to have her own specific endogenous effects in each network. This
design enables the selection at the network level which implies some networks can be classified as
completely irrelevant to decision-making. Furthermore, as the asymptotic allows the number of
networks q to go to infinity, my model can handle those cases when researchers observe a large
number of networks (q > n).
LASSO:
My paper contributes to the growing literature on endogenous regressors in LASSO estimators. For
instance, Belloni et al. (2014) proposes the double selection mechanism to study confounded treat-
ment effects. Fan and Liao (2014) proposes a GMM type estimator to deal with many endogenous
regressors. Gautier and TsyBakov (2014) proposes a Self Tuning Instrumental Variables (STIV)
estimator. The paper that is closest to mine is Zhu (2018), which studies the statistical properties
of two-stage least square procedure with high-dimensional endogenous regressors. The two-stage
estimator proposed in Zhu (2018) assumes an i.i.d error term for the first stage. However, this
assumption is incompatible with SAR model as the structure assumptions in SAR lead to a first
stage with correlated unobservables. In this paper, I derive the rate of convergence and consistency
of selection for a two-stage LASSO estimator under the presence of spatial errors. I show that
a modified “de-bias” LASSO estimator accounting for spatial errors can be constructed for my
estimator in a manner similar to Zhang and Zhang (2011), Bu¨hlmann (2013), van de Geer et al.
(2014), and Zhu (2018). I derive its asymptotic distributions and show how to perform inference.
This paper also extends LASSO literature by deriving statistical bounds and consistency of selection
for sparse group LASSO estimator. Yuan and Lin (2006) proposes the group LASSO, in which
explanatory variables are represented by different groups. The group LASSO assumes that sparsity
exists only among groups, i.e. some groups of variables are relevant while other groups are not.
Simon et al. (2013) proposes the sparse group LASSO, which further allows sparsity within each
group, i.e. some regressors within the relevant groups can also be irrelevant. Bunea et al. (2014)
derives statistical properties for the square-root group LASSO, which combines group LASSO and
square-root LASSO. When estimating a heterogeneous endogenous effects model with multiple
networks, I establish both statistical bounds and consistency of selection for the sparse group
LASSO estimator. Sparse group LASSO differs from group LASSO by allowing the number of
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regressors in each group to also goes to infinity as the number of groups goes to infinity. To the
best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to show asymptotic statistical properties for the sparse
group LASSO estimator.
Networks:
My paper shares similar microfoundations with SARs as discussed in Blume et al. (2015), where
the individual utility function can be written as a linear summation of the private and social
components. The private component is a quadratic loss function on individual’s efforts. The social
components depend on the network structure as well as the efforts of one’s neighbors. While the
marginal rate of substitution between the private and social components of utility is assumed fixed
in SARs, I assume this rate is individual-specific and depends on one’s neighbors. My paper applies
and extends LASSO approaches to deal with a high-dimensional problem in networks. The total
number of possible edges in a network is n2, however, the social interaction networks we often
observe are far more sparse. This is an ideal setting where penalized estimators like LASSO could
be applied. Manresa (2013) studies the heterogeneous exogenous effects in a network using LASSO.
de Paula et al. (2015) explores the use of LASSO to recover network structures. Both these two
papers consider panel data and rely on repeated observations of the same network to identify their
models. My model considers cross-sectional data. To identify an individual’s endogenous effects, I
rely on the variations in her neighbors’ outcome.
My paper also relates to the literature on identifying the key players in the network following
Ballester et al. (2006), Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009), and Horrace et al. (2016). Under the frame-
work of SARs, every individual is assumed to have the same endogenous effects. As a result,
individuals who are well-connected in the network (with high centrality measure) are considered
as the key players. However, well connected individuals may effectively have zero effects on their
neighbors under heterogeneous endogenous effects. Indeed, as shown in the empirical application,
well connected villagers such as tailors, hotel workers, veterans, and barbers are not influential in
other villagers’ decisions to join the micro-finance program.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I introduce the model; in Section 3, I
discuss assumptions; in Section 4, I design estimation procedures and derive consistency and asymp-
totic properties; in Section 5, I show finite sample performance using Monte Carlo simulations; in
Section 6, I apply my proposed model to study influential individuals and effective networks in
promoting micro-finance programs in rural India; and in Section 7, I conclude.
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2 Models
2.1 Benchmark Endogenous Effects Model
Let n denotes the total number of observed individuals in a network. The outcome of individual i
is denoted as di and is the variable of interest. Here di can represent outcome variable of interest
associated with individual i, such as whether to join a program or i’s labor productivity. In standard
SAR model, it is assumed that the outcome of each neighbor of individual i impacts her outcome
homogeneously through a constant rate λ0:
di = λ0
∑
j∈Ni
dj + xiβ0 + i, (1)
where the set Ni is defined as individual i’s neighbors. The matrix form of this model is expressed
as follows:
Dn = λ0MnDn +Xnβ0 + n, (2)
where Dn = (d1, d2, · · · , dn)′ is the n-dimensional vector of observable outcomes. The n by k matrix
Xn represents the observable exogenous characteristics of individuals. When n is specified as an
n-dimensional vector of independent and identically distributed disturbances with zero mean and
a constant variance σ2, equation (2) is also called a mixed regression model.
The spatial weight matrix Mn is of size n by n, where the (i, j)th entry represents the connection
between individual i and individual j. In empirical studies, the spatial weight matrix is often
replaced by the adjacency matrix (see Ammermuller and Pischke, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Banerjee et al., 2013): the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix Mn takes value 1 if individual i and individual
j are connected and takes value 0 otherwise; the diagonal entries of the matrix Mn are always 0s.
In the SAR literature, spatial weight matrix or adjacency matrix is taken as exogenous. My
method follows this assumption and is designed for cross-sectional data. However, it is important
to recognize that social networks do change over time and it is then important to take network
formation into modeling (see Christakis et al. (2010), Sheng (2016)).
In mixed regression model, endogenous effects (see Manski, 1993) or network effects (see Bramoulle´
et al., 2009) are captured by the scalar λ0. An implicit assumption in equation (2) is that λ0, the
rate of endogenous effects, is identical across all individuals in the network. Although a limited
degree of heterogeneity can be built into the adjacency matrix via pre-specified structure assump-
tions, the identification potential for heterogeneous endogenous effects has not been fully explored.
This limitation has been noted in various studies (see Ammermuller and Pischke, 2009; de Paula
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et al., 2015). I relax this assumption by proposing a more flexible model that allows and identifies
individual-specific endogenous effects as discussed below.
2.2 Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model
I propose the following model:
di =
∑
j∈Ni
djηj + xiβ + i (3)
where Ni represents the set of individual i’s neighbors and ηj represents the endogenous effects of
individual j on the outcome of all her neighbors i ∈ Nj . the model can be rewritten in matrix form
as:
Dn =
(
Mn ◦Dn
)
η0 +Xnβ0 + n, (4)
where η0 = (η1, η2, · · · , ηn)′ is a vector of parameter of size n by 1. The ith entry in η0 represents the
endogenous effects of individual i on her neighbors. This model allows for individual heterogeneity
to interact with endogenous effects so that every individual is allowed to have her own coefficient
ηi. My model allows some ηj = 0. In other word, there are individuals that impose no endogenous
effects on their neighbors. I define those individuals with ηj 6= 0 as influential.
The operator ◦ is defined between a n by n matrix Mn and a n by 1 vector Dn as
Mn ◦Dn = Mn · diag(Dn) = C,
where diag(·) is the diagonalization operator and Ci,j = Mi,jdj .
Note that in contrast to fixed rate λ0 specified in equation (2), even though each neighbor of
individual j is assumed to receive the same influence djηj from her, each individual is allowed to
influence her neighbors at her own rate ηj .
A more generalized form of the model is to replace ηj with ηij . This generalization can further
capture the different perceiving rate of endogenous effects on the same leader but among different
followers. However, the number of parameters increase from n to n2 and the model becomes too
saturated to estimate.
Another direction of modeling is to assume heterogeneous perceiving rate of endogenous effects but
maintaining the assumption of homogeneous influencing rate, for example
di = λ
∗
i
∑
j∈Ni
dj + xiβ + i
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This model has been studied using random coefficients approach in Masten (2018). This specifica-
tion differs from equation (3) as it prevents any sparsity pattern on λ∗i to be passed to a first stage
regression as shown in proposition 1. As a result, the identification strategies are fundamentally
different.
Equation (4) can be derived from a bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Let (xi, i) denotes an individual’s
type, where xi is publicly observed characteristics and i is private characteristics only observable
by i. Individual i’s utility depends on her own action and characteristics as well as her neighbors’
actions. Individual i chooses action di to maximize the following utility:
Ui(di, d−i) = (xiβ + i)di − 1
2
d2i +
∑
j∈Ni
djdiηj
The first order condition yields equation (4). The micro-foundations derived above is similar to the
one for SARs as discussed in Blume et al. (2015).
2.3 Motivating Examples
Peer Effects in Labor Productivity:
Understanding the mechanism and magnitude of the dependence of labor productivity on coworkers
is an important question for economists and policy makers. As found in Mas and Moretti (2009),
workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact. Another
modern example is on code sharing platforms like GitHub. Programmers provide efforts to an
open source project depending on how much other programers are contributing. In such cases, the
influence level of each individual to hers coworkers is not the same. Equation (4) can be used to
incorporate such differences.
yi =
∑
j∈Ni
yjηj + xiβ + i,
where yi is individual i’s productivity, and ηj represents the size of influence of coworker j – all
else being equal, the additional effect on individual i’s productivity if individual j becomes her
coworker.
Note that if we restrict the parameters ηj to be the same across different workers, then we are back
to the classical SARs setting as laid out in equation (2). Thus, λ = 1n
∑n
j=1 ηj can be interpreted as
the averaged spillover effects in the canonical sense. Notice that λ converges to 0 when the spillover
effects are sparse and it may lead to the conclusion that there is no spillover in the network under
such scenario.
9
Define
λ∗ =
1∑
1ηj 6=0
n∑
j=1
ηj1ηj 6=0
as the averaged endogenous effects for influential workers. The estimand λ∗ is arguably better than
λ for average endogenous effects as it excludes individuals who are not influential to their neighbors.
Online Opinion Leaders:
A decision can represent whether to “tweet” a news story seen online. When individuals make
such decisions, they are often influenced by several online opinion leaders – whether those people
also “tweet” the news or not. Political figures may have stronger influence on people’s tweet for
political news than celebrities. And vice versa for entertainment news. Assume a binary decision
(0, 1) is made from a bayesian Nash Equilibrium, such that
d∗i =
∑
j∈Ni
d∗jηj + xiβ + i,
where d∗i is the probability of individual i playing action 1, and
∑
j∈Nj d
∗
jηj is the expected endoge-
nous effects from i’s neighbors Ni . Define
S = {j : ηj 6= 0}
as truly influential opinion leaders. My method provides a way to estimate Sˆ which is asymptotically
consistent with S. This is an important metric to policy makers or private sectors as targeting or
nudging the influential individuals is usually more efficient than targeting the entire population.
2.4 Two Extensions of the Model
Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Cliques:
There are two important assumptions for equation (4). First is the sparsity assumption, which
requires non-influential individuals to have completely zero influence on their neighbors. Second
it assumes away the exogenous and correlated effects. Consider a network composed of many
cliques (small groups of connected individuals). Each clique has its local leaders who only influence
individuals within their own clique. Figure 1 provides an example of such a network structure.
Note that in Figure 1, node S2, S3 and S4 represent local leaders who only influence individuals
within their own cliques. On the contrary, node S1 represents a global leader who can influence
individuals across different cliques. For example, one can think about the local leaders S2, S3 and
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S4 as local news channels while S1 is the national news channel. Furthermore, within each clique,
there might exist exogenous and correlated effects. I propose an extension to my heterogeneous
endogenous effects model which could address such concerns. I assume that all local leaders will
influence their followers at a small but similar rate while global leaders can have different effects
on their audience.
S1
S2S3
S4
Figure 1: Local Leader
First, I consider the following extension to introduce only homogeneous endogenous effects:
di =
∑
j∈Ni
djηj + γ0
∑
j∈Ni
dj + xiβ0 + i,
which can be represented in matrix form as:
Dn =
(
Mn ◦Dn
)
η0 +MnDnγ0 +Xnβ0 + n, (5)
where η′0 = (η1, η2, · · · , ηn)′. The new term γ0
∑
j∈Ni dj captures influence from the local level.
Note that this is the same term as the spatial lag in the benchmark spatial autoregression model.
The vector η0 captures the heterogeneous endogenous effects of global leaders.
To further include exogenous and correlated effects, consider the following model:
di =
∑
j∈Ni
djηj + γ
end
0
∑
j∈Ni
dj + γ
exo
0
∑
j∈Ni
xj + xiβ0 + µc + i, (6)
Besides the first term representing heterogeneous endogenous effects, equation (6) is the same as
the model in Manski (1993).
Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Multiple Networks:
Individuals are often connected with each other through more than one type of network. For
example, one’s financial network (for borrowing/lending) may be different from hers relative network
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or even friendship network. A common strategy in empirical application is to “pool” the networks
by mixing all types of connections into one network. This approach may increase the noise in the
network measurement when the outcome variables only depend on certain types of networks.
To capture different types of connections among the same set of individuals, we can incorporate
multiple networks in the heterogeneous endogenous model. More specifically, a separate adjacency
matrix can be constructed for each type of network. For instance, the (i, j)-th entry of the adjacency
matrix representing friendship takes value 1 if individual i and individual j are friends and takes
value 0 otherwise; that representing the borrowing/lending network takes value 1 if individual i
and individual j lend money to each other and takes value 0 otherwise.
Let q be the total number of different types of networks. Define M ln as the adjacency matrix for
the lth network. The heterogeneous endogenous effects model with multiple networks is defined as
di =
q∑
l=1
∑
k∈Ni
dlkη
l
k + xiβ0 + i (7)
Note that in this model, different networks could potentially bear different endogenous effects for
the same individual. In equation (7), coefficient ηlk represents the rate of endogenous effect of
individual k through network l. As a result, we have nq + k coefficients for endogenous effects. In
addition, I assume endogenous effects from different types of networks are linearly additive. The
model can also be rewritten in matrix form as:
Dn =
q∑
l=1
(
M ln ◦Dn
)
ηl0 +Xnβ0 + n, (8)
where M ln is the adjacency matrix for network l. η
l = (ηl1, η
l
2, · · · , ηln)′ is an n by 1 vector for l =
1, 2, · · · , q. Define a network l as efficient network if ηli 6= 0 for at least one individual i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
In this specification, leaders can only influence their neighbors through efficient networks and non-
efficient networks are completely independent from the outcome variable.
3 Assumptions
The assumptions discussed in this section combine both standard SARs type assumptions and
LASSO type assumptions. SARs type assumptions ensure the existence of valid instruments.
LASSO type assumptions provide sufficient and necessary conditions for valid inference. The iden-
tification for influential individuals is achieved through its coincidence with the sparsity pattern in
the reduced form estimator.
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First recall the benchmark SAR model:
Dn = λ0MnDn +Xnβ0 + n, (9)
By rearranging the above equation, we can express endogenous variable MnDn solely as a function
of Xn and Mn, since:
Dn = J
−1
n Xnβ0 + J
−1
n n
where In is the n by n identity matrix and Jn = In − λ0Mn. It is straightforward that J−1n Xn can
serve as valid instruments for MnDn. As a result, the identification and estimation of equation (9)
can be achieved through either 2SLS or GMM as proposed in papers such as Kelejian and Prucha
(1995), Kelejian and Prucha (1998) Lee (2002), Lee (2003), and Lee (2004). Following the same
strategy, I derive a set of instruments by solving Dn as a function of exogenous variables and the
adjacency matrix.
3.1 Assumptions for the Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model
Without additional restrictions, equation (4) could not be estimated through canonical method as
the number of parameters n+ k is greater than the number of observations n.
Assumption 1 (Sparsity). Let Sn ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the set of influential individuals (i.e.
ηj 6= 0). Let sn = |Sn| be the number of elements in Sn.
sn = o
( √
n
log n
)
, as n→∞
Assumption 1 is usually referred to as “sparsity” assumption. The assumption that most individuals
in a network are not influential is plausible under many circumstances. For example, opinion leaders
on social media only constitute a very small fraction of internet users. Star programmers who can
encourage other programmers to work with them on Github are also a small portion of all Github
users. On the other hand, assumption 1 can be easily violated when there exists many local leaders.
For example, when studying the peer effects in obesity among school children, each class/grade can
be treated as a clique and as the number of cliques increases, the number of leaders may increase at
a rate of O(n). In next subsection, I propose an extension of the current model to partially address
this problem.
Assumption 2 (SAR restrictions).
- There exists an ηmax < 1 such that ‖η0‖∞ ≤ ηmax
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- The j are i.i.d sub-Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and variance σ
2
- The regressors xi in Xn are non-stochastic and uniformly bounded for all n. limn→∞X ′nXn/n
exists and is nonsingular
- The minimum eigenvalue of (In −Mn ◦ η0), Λmin, is uniformly bounded away from 0.
The restriction on η0 excludes the unit root process and ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium. It
guarantees the invertibility of
(
In −Mn ◦ η0
)
. This is a fundamental assumption required in all
SAR literatures see Upton and Fingleton (1985); Anselin (1988); Jin and Lee (2018)).
The assumption on the error term currently excludes exogenous effects and correlated effects from
my model. The SAR model with this exclusion restriction is known as mixed regression model as
in (see Lee, 2002). The main challenge to relax this assumption is known as “reflection problem” as
pointed out in Manski (1993). I adopt a strategy similar to Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) to incorporate
both exogenous and correlated effects in next subsection. I also require the error term to be
sub-Gaussian so that concentration inequalities can be derived to bound the empirical process.
Sub-Gaussian process is known to have “almost” bounded support due to the fast decay of its tails.
This assumption is usually required for high dimensional estimators as in Belloni et al. (2014), Zhu
(2018) and etc.
The assumption on the regressors follows the convention in the SAR literatures see Anselin (1988);
Jin and Lee (2018). This deterministic design assumption can be extended to the random design
cases under my model. In the following context, I focus on the case where Xn is an n by 1 vector
and study identification as in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009).
I also require the minimum eigenvalue of (In−Mn ◦η0) to be uniformly bounded away from 0. This
is to prevent the spatial errors from accumulating too fast. The spatial error term after the matrix
inversion is (In −Mn ◦ η0)−1. A similar assumption can be found in Kelejian and Prucha (1995)
and Kelejian and Prucha (1998), which requires the uniformly boundedness of (In −Mn ◦ η0)−1.
To proceed, recall the definition of the operator “◦” as Mn ◦Dn = Mn · diag(Dn), where diag(·) is
the diagonalization operator. Note the following property of the “◦”:(
Mn ◦Dn
)
η0 =
(
Mn ◦ η0
)
Dn
If the invertibility of
(
In −Mn ◦ η0
)
is guaranteed, then
Dn =
(
Mn ◦Dn
)
η0 +Xnβ0 + n ⇔ Dn =
∞∑
i=0
(
Mn ◦ η0
)i
(Xnβ0 + n) (10)
14
Since
(
Mn◦Dn
)
η0 is correlated with n and η0 is sparse (i.e. having at most sn non-zero elements),
we need at least sn instruments to deal with the endogeneity in the model. Using equation (10),
we can express the expectation of Dn as follows:
E(Dn) = Xnβ0 +
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
(βη0) +
∞∑
i=2
(
Mn ◦ η0
)i
Xnβ0, (11)
Let (·)S denote the operator such that (Mn)S is a sub matrix of Mn with its columns restricted to
columns corresponding to the elements of S. The first and second terms of equation (11) suggest
that Xn and (Mn ◦Xn)S can serve as valid instruments to point identify β0 and η0.
Proposition 1 (First Stage Equivalence). Under assumption 1 and 2
E(Dn) = Xnβ0 +
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
η˜, (12)
where η˜j = ηj g˜(η0, β0, Xn,Mn) for some function g˜ depends on η0, β0, Xn, and Mn.
Proposition 1 shows the sparsity pattern is preserved when solving the simultaneous equations since
η˜j = 0 as long as ηj = 0
1. As a result, the sparsity assumption is also satisfied in equation (12),
and I can thus estimate equation (12) as the first stage using a LASSO type estimator.
Define Wn as the projection matrix on to the orthogonal space of Xn: Wn = In−Xn(X ′nXn)−1X ′n
Assumption 3 (Independence). Wn(Mn ◦Xn)S has full column rank.
The linear independence among (Mn ◦Xn)S requires the assumption that any two influential indi-
viduals may not necessarily connect with identical neighbors. Moreover, assumption 3 also requires
that neighbors of an influential individual cannot be a linear combination of neighbors of several
other influential individuals, which rules out network structures as depicted in Figure 2.
1de Paula et al. (2015) noticed that sparsity pattern will generally not be preserved during matrix inversion when
there is no further restriction on the adjacency matrix. Proposition 1 shows that with pre-existing network structure
and homogeneous influence assumption for a given influential individual, sparsity pattern can still be preserved after
matrix inversion.
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S1
S2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3: Examples of networks which satisfies assumption 3
The influence of S1 can be identified by comparing red (right shaded) and grey groups (plain), while the
influence of S2 can be identified by comparing blue (left shaded) and grey (plain) groups. Or the influence
of S1 can be identified by comparing green (dotted) and blue (left shaded) groups, while the influence of
S2 can be identified by comparing red (right shaded) and green (dotted) groups.
S1
S2
. . .
(1)
S1
S2S3
. . . . . .
(2)
Figure 2: Examples of networks which violate assumption 3
(1) Two influential individual S1 and S2 share the exact same neighbors. (2) The neighbors of an influential
individual S1 is a linear combination of S2 and S3’s neighbors.
In other words, as long as each influential individual has a neighbor that is not connected with any
other influential individuals, assumption 3 is satisfied. One can think of the identification here as
estimating fixed effects from influential individuals as illustrated in Figure 3. Collinearity arises
when the fixed effects of two influential individuals are imposed on exactly the same observations.
Assumption 3 is essentially a restriction on the topology of network structures. It rules out cases
like complete network or cases (1) and (2) as in Figure 2. To achieve identification under a cross-
sectional network data, one has to rely on certain network structures. Similar assumptions can be
found in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) and de Paula et al. (2015).
At this point, if the truly influential individuals set Sn were available to us, we would be able
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to estimate the model using 2SLS method or GMM. However, in most cases, Sn is not known
beforehand. Notice that the identification for the set Sn in the structure model (4) coincides with
the sparsity pattern in the reduced form (12). I propose to use a LASSO type estimator to both
recover the set of influential individuals and estimate the model. For LASSO to achieve correct
recovery, I need the following assumptions:
Assumption 4. [LASSO restrictions]
(Irrepresentable Condition) There is a ϑ ∈ (0, 1) such that
max
‖u‖∞≤1
∥∥diag(fSc) · ΣM2,1(ΣM1,1)−1 · diag(fS)−1 · u∥∥∞ < ϑ
where
Σ :=
1
n
M ′nWnMn =
(
ΣM1,1 Σ
M
1,2
ΣM2,1 Σ
M
2,2
)
and
f = (I −Mn ◦ η0)−1Xnβ0
(Beta Min Condition) There exists N ∈ N and a m > 0 such that ∀n ≥ N ,
min(|η0|)S ≥ m/
√
n,
Here define the operator (·)S as the sub-matrix/vector restricted to the columns/entries corre-
sponding to influential individuals. Similarly, (·)Sc represents the sub-matrix/vector restricted by
the columns/entries corresponding to non-influential individuals. Also notice that the invertibility
of ΣM1,1 is guaranteed by assumption 3.
We prove in theorem 2 that assumption 4 is a sufficient condition for the LASSO estimator to
achieve a consistent selection for the set Sn in the second stage. While assumption 3 restricts how
influential individual may connect with their neighbors, assumption 4 restricts how non-influential
individual may connect. For example, Irrepresentable Condition prevents the neighbors of a non-
influential individual to be exactly the same as the neighbors of any influential individual. This is
because when two individuals connect with exactly the same neighbors, we cannot distinguish which
individual is the true source of influence. This is illustrated in Figure 4 (1). On the other hand,
assumption 4 does not require full independence between influential individuals and non-influential
individuals. This is illustrated in Figure 4 (2).
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S1
. . .
s4
(1)
S1
. . . . . .
. . .
s4
(2)
Figure 4: Examples of networks which violate and satisfy assumption 4
In (1), the influence of S1 can not be separately identified from S4 although S1 is influential and S4 is
non-influential. In (2), the influence of S1 can be identified by comparing red (right shaded) and blue
(left shaded) groups. And then we can find out S4 is non-influential by comparing blue (left shaded) and
green (dotted) groups.
The Beta Min Condition requires the magnitude of the endogenous effects to be sufficiently strong
in order to be detected by LASSO. For example, there does not exist a sequence of individuals
whose influence decay to 0 faster than the rate of 1/
√
n. Beta Min Condition is restrictive such
that it rules out uniform inference and creates additional problems when constructing confidence
intervals.
Equation (4) can still be consistently estimated under weaker conditions than Irrepresentable Con-
dition and Beta Min Condition. The stronger version is assumed above to ensure selection consis-
tency. As shown in Zhao and Yu (2006), the Irrepresentable Condition together with the Beta Min
Condition are necessary and sufficient conditions for LASSO to achieve consistent model selection.
The following compatibility condition will guarantee the valid inference using “de-bias” estimator
proposed in the next section.
Assumption 4-1 (Compatibility Condition). For some φ0 > 0 (independent of n) and for all η
satisfying ‖ηSc‖1 ≤ 3‖ηS‖1, it holds that
‖ηS‖21 ≤ (η′(Mn)′SWn(Mn)Sη)s0/φ20,
Assumption 4-1 is referred as compatibility condition as in van de Geer et al. (2014). It also restricts
the network topology (i.e complete network is still ruled out) but is weaker than assumption 3 +
assumption 4. Under assumption 4-1, we can still construct uniformly valid inference for de-bias
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estimator proposed in the next section even though consistent model selection is not guaranteed.
3.2 Assumptions for Two Extensions
Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Cliques:
The heterogeneous endogenous effects model with cliques can be written in matrix form as:
Dn =
(
Mn ◦Dn
)
η0 +MnDnγ0 +Xnβ0 + n
Assumption 1’ (Sparsity with Cliques). Among n individuals in the network, let Sn ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n}
be the set of global leaders. Let sn = |Sn| be the number of elements in Sn. Assume:
sn = o
( √
n
log n
)
, as n→∞
Assumption 1’ relaxes the exact sparsity in assumption 1 without imposing any restriction on the
number of local leaders. For example, it does not rule out situations where everyone is (locally)
influential. Local leaders’ influence will be captured by the γ0, coefficient of classical spatial lag.
The number of global leaders is restricted to be sparse and we can identify these leaders similar as
in previous case.
To ensure invertibility of the matrix
(
In −Mn ◦ η0 −Mnγ0
)
, I modify assumption 2 as:
Assumption 2’ (SAR Restrictions with Cliques). In addition to assumption 2, there exists an
ηmax < 1 such that ‖η0 + γ0‖∞ ≤ ηmax
Similar to assumption 2, this assumption excludes unit root processes. Since there exists a local
level influence γ0 in the network, global level influence η0 need to be further bounded away from
1. As a result, equation (5) can be transformed into the following:
E(Dn) = Xnβ0 +
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
(β0η0) +MnXn(β0γ0) +
∞∑
i=2
(
Mn ◦ η0 + γ0Mn
)i
β0Xn (13)
Proposition 2 (First Stage Equivalence with Cliques). Under assumption 1’ and 2’
E(Dn) = Xnβ + (Mn ◦Xn)η˜∗,∞ +
∞∑
i=1
γi0M
i
nXnβ0 +
∞∑
i=1
M in(Mn ◦Xn)˜˜η∗,(i,∞),
where
η˜∗,∞j = η0,j g˜
∞
k,j(η0, γ0, β0, Xn,Mn), ˜˜η
∗,(i,∞)
j = η0,j h˜
(i,∞)
k,j (η0, γ0, β0, Xn,Mn)
for some function g˜∞k,j and h˜
(i,∞)
k,j depend on β0, γ0, η0, Xn, and Mn.
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From proposition 2, in order for the coefficient γ0 introduced in equation (5) to be identified. An
extra instrument MnXn need to be introduced. And thus we need to assume additional indepen-
dence:
Assumption 3’ (Independence with Cliques).
[
Wn(Mn ◦Xn)S ,WnMnXn
]
has full column rank.
To further incorporate exogenous and correlated effects, recall equation (6) can be written in matrix
form as
Dn =
(
M∗n ◦Dn
)
η0 +M
∗
nDnγ
end
0 +M
∗
nXnγ
exo
0 +Xnβ0 + µc + n
Here, I define M∗n as the row sum normalized version of Mn. The main challenge for the identi-
fication is known as “reflection problem” (Manski (1993)). Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) proposed the
“neighbor’s neighbor” instruments as a solution. By taking the local difference, we can obtain the
following form
(I−M∗n)Dn = (I−M∗n)
(
M∗n◦Dn
)
η0+(I−M∗n)M∗nDnγend0 +(I−M∗n)M∗nXnγexo0 +(I−M∗n)Xnβ0+(I−M∗n)n
and invert the simultaneous equation, we have
E((I −M∗n)Dn) =
(
I −M∗n ◦ η0 −M∗nγend0
)−1(
β0 · I + γexo0 M∗n
)
(I −M∗n)Xn,
Proposition 3 (First Stage Equivalence with Cliques + exogenous and correlated effects). Under
assumption 1’ and 2’ and assume M∗n is row sum normalized
E((I −M∗n)Dn) = (I −M∗n)Xnβ0 + (γexo0 + γend0 β0)M∗n(I −M∗n)Xn + (M∗n ◦Xn)η˜∗2,∞
+
∞∑
i=1
(γend0 )
i(γexo0 + γ
end
0 )M
∗(i+1)
n (I −M∗n)Xnβ0 +
∞∑
i=1
M∗in (Mn ◦Xn)˜˜η∗2,(i,∞)
where
η˜∗2,∞j = η0,j g˜
∞
2,k,j(η0, γ
exo
0 , γ
end
0 , β0, Xn,Mn), ˜˜η
∗2,(i,∞)
j = η0,j h˜
(i,∞)
2,k,j (η0, γ
exo
0 , γ
end
0 , β0, Xn,Mn)
for some function g˜∞2,k,j and h˜
(i,∞)
2,k,j depend on β0, γ
exo
0 , γ
end
0 , η0, Xn, and Mn.
Assumption 3’-1. Assume γexo0 +β0γ
end
0 6= 0 and
[
Wn(M
∗
n◦Xn)S ,WnM∗nXn,WnM∗2n Xn,WnM∗3n Xn
]
is full rank and M∗ is row sum normalizable.
Similar to proposition 4 in Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), assumption 3’-1 requires the independence
between M∗nXn and M∗2n Xn in order to use the “neighbor’s neighbors” as instruments to address
the “reflection” problem. Furthermore, the independence of M∗3n Xn will pin down the identification
for correlated effects.
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Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Multiple Networks:
The heterogeneous endogenous effects model with multiple networks can be represented in matrix
form as follows:
Dn =
q∑
j=1
(
M jn ◦Dn
)
ηj0 +Xnβ0 + n
The number of coefficients in this model becomes nq + k and the number of observed networks q
may also increase as the number of observations n increases. As a result, the sparsity assumption
will be imposed on both the influential individuals and the effective networks. I assume that some
of the networks are completely irrelevant (i.e. ηj0 = 0) and that relevant networks are not necessarily
passing influence for everyone (i.e. ηj0 6= 0 but ηj0,i = 0 for some i).
Second, to ensure invertibility, for any matrix norm ‖.‖:∥∥∥∥∥∥
q∑
j=1
(
M jn ◦ ηj0
)∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
q∑
j=1
∥∥∥(M jn ◦ ηj0)∥∥∥ ≤ q∑
j=1
‖ηj0‖∞
∥∥∥ (M jn) ∥∥∥
Because M jn is the adjacency matrix such that each entry is 0 or 1,
∑q
j=1 ‖ηj0‖∞ < 1 guarantees
the invertibility of I −∑qj=1 (M jn ◦ ηj0).
Proposition 4 (First Stage Equivalence – Multiple Networks). Under assumption assumption 1*
and assumption 2*
E(Dn) = Xnβ0 +
q∑
j=1
(
M jn ◦Xn
)
(η˜j0)
where η˜jk = η
j
kg˜
j(η0, β0, Xn,Mn) for some function g˜
j depends on ηj0, β0, Xn, and M
j
n.
Third, I require
[
Xn,
(
M1n ◦Xn
)
S
,
(
M2n ◦Xn
)
S
, · · · ,
(
M qn ◦Xn
)
S
]
to be full rank. Compared with
the standard model, this assumption requires the independence condition to hold across different
networks. The four assumptions required for multiple networks are listed formally in the appendix
as assumption assumption 1*, 2*, 3*, and 4*.
4 Estimators and Asymptotics
The proposed estimator is similar to the two-stage least square method but use LASSO in both
stages.
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Two-Stage LASSO Estimator:
- First Stage:
(β˜, η˜) = arg min
β,η
‖Dn −Xnβ −
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
η‖22 + λ1|η|1 (14)
Obtain a LASSO fitting Dˆn
Dˆn = Xnβ˜ +
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
η˜
- Second Stage:
(βˆ, ηˆ) = arg min
β,η
‖Dn −
(
Mn ◦ Dˆn
)
η −Xnβ‖22 + λ|η|1 (15)
As shown in section 3,
(
Mn ◦ Dn
)
is correlated with n. Thus equation (4), equation (5) and
equation (8) cannot be estimated directly using LASSO or sparse group LASSO. The instruments
proposed in section 3 are [Xn, (Mn ◦Xn)S ]. We do not observe the set S but [Xn, (Mn ◦Xn)] is a
set of regressors that contains the valid instruments.
4.1 de-bias 2SLSS Estimator
The estimator βˆ and ηˆ suffer from LASSO shrinkage bias. Moreover, post model selection inference
conditioning on the selected model Sˆn = {i|ηˆ 6= 0} suffers from the omitted variable bias and thus
is not uniformly valid (see Leeb and Potscher, 2005, 2008, 2009). I construct a “de-bias” estimator
under my setting and derive the asymptotic distribution for it. I propose the following de-bias
LASSO estimator:
de-bias 2SLSS Estimator:
eˆ = ηˆ + ΘˆX˜ ′n(Mn ◦ Dˆn)′Wn(Dn − (Mn ◦Dn)ηˆ)/n
bˆ = βˆ −
(Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)′
(
(Mn ◦ (Dˆn −Dn))ηˆ
)
(Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)′Xn
βˆ and ηˆ are estimators from the 2SLSS. Define Wn =
(
I − Xn(X ′nXn)−X ′n
)
. X˜n = 1n(Mn ◦
Dn)
′Wn(Mn◦Dˆn), Θˆ are defined by the nodewise regression as in Meinshausen and Bu¨hlmann (2006)
on X˜n and γˆβ are again defined by the nodewise regression on between Xn and (Mn◦Dn). Nodewise
regression explores the correlation between the columns of the design matrix X˜n by regressing each
column on all the rest of the columns while penalizing the coefficients. An approximation of the
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inverse of the matrix 1n X˜ ′nX˜n can be constructed based on nodewise regression. Further, define
Sˆn = {i|ηˆ 6= 0}, which represents the LASSO selected active set. The estimators (eˆ, bˆ) are adjusted
for the LASSO shrinkage bias and are a consistent estimator for η and β. They are similar to the
estimators proposed in van de Geer et al. (2014), but are constructed through a two-stage process.
The de-bias estimator also differs from the two-stage estimators proposed in Zhu (2018) due to
spatial correlation.
Theorem 1. Under assumption 1, assumption 2 and assumption 4-1. There exist constant c1, c2, c3
and ι : ‖ι‖0 < ∞ such that for the first stage tuning parameter λ1 ≥ 2
√
4σ2c1Λ
−2
min logn
n and second
stage tuning parameter λ ≥ 2
√
4σ2c3Λ
−2
min logn
n + 2c2λ1 + 2c3λ1, the de-bias estimator
√
n(ι′eˆ− ι′η0) = 1√
n
ι′ΘˆX˜ ′n− ι′∆ ∼ N(0, σ2ι′ΘˆX˜ ′nΩnX˜nΘˆ′ι)
√
n(bˆ− β0) = (Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)
′
(Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)′Xn + ∆β ∼ N
0, σ2 (Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)′(Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)(
(Xn − (Mn ◦Dn)γˆβ)′Xn
)2

where ‖∆‖∞ = op(1), ‖∆β‖∞ = op(1), X˜n = 1n(Mn◦Dn)′Wn(Mn◦Dˆn), Ωn = 1n(Mn◦Dˆn)′Wn(Mn◦
Dˆn), Θˆ are defined by the nodewise regression on X˜n and γˆβ are defined by the nodewise regression
on between Xn and (Mn ◦Dn).
Theorem 1 shows that the 2SLSS estimator achieves normality at the standard rate
√
n. The shifts
∆ and ∆β represent the bias from using nodewise regression and they are shown to be op(1) with
the proper choice of tuning parameters.
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1-4, there exist γ˜ > 1 and ϑ˜ = 1+ϑ1−ϑ . For λ ≥ 4(γ˜∨ϑ˜)
√
σ2c3Λ
−2
min logn
n +
2c2λ1 + 2c3λ1,
lim
n→∞P(Sˆn = S) = 1
;
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4.2 2SLSS for Two Extensions
Two-Stage LASSO Estimator with Homogenous Effects:
- First Stage: for a pre-specified constant k,
(β˜, γ˜, η˜) = arg min
β,γ,η
∥∥∥∥∥Dn −Xnβ −
k∑
i=1
M inXnγ
1,i −
k∑
i=0
M in
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
η1,i
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+λ
(
k∑
i=1
|η1,i|1 + |γ1,i|
)
Obtain a LASSO fitting Dˆn
Dˆn = Xnβ˜ +MnXnγ˜ +
(
Mn ◦Xn
)
η˜
- Second Stage:
(βˆ, γˆ, ηˆ) = arg min
β,γ,η
‖Dn −MnDˆnγ −
(
Mn ◦ Dˆn
)
η −Xnβ‖22 + λ(|η|1 + |γ|)
From proposition 2, the sparsity pattern can not be fully preserved by (Mn ◦ Xn) so additional
structures like M in(Mn ◦ Xn) need to be included in the first stage. Those terms represent the
influence from global leaders but passing ith times through local leaders. By assumption 2’, the
influence represented by M in(Mn ◦Xn) decreases as i increases.
The second stage of 2SLSS with Cliques case can be viewed as a special case of the standard 2SLSS
estimator. For example, one can rewrite the second stage as
(β˜, γ˜, η˜) = arg min
β,γ,η
∥∥∥∥∥Dn −Xnβ − ( MnDˆn (Mn ◦ Dˆn) ) ·
(
γ
η
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ λ1|η|1 + λ1|γ|1
As a result, asymptotics as theorem 1 and theorem 2 follows.
To incorporate the structure of multiple networks, I propose the use of sparse group LASSO.
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Two-Stage LASSO Estimator with Multiple Networks:
- First Stage:
(β˜, η˜) = arg min
β,η

∥∥∥∥∥∥Dn −Xnβ −
q∑
j=1
(M jn ◦Xn)ηj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+
 q∑
j=1
(
λ1‖ηj‖2 + λ2‖ηj‖1
)
Obtain a LASSO fitting Dˆn
Dˆn = Xnβ˜ +
q∑
j=1
(M jn ◦Xn)η˜j
- Second Stage:
(βˆ, ηˆ) = arg min
β,η

∥∥∥∥∥∥Dn −Xnβ −
q∑
j=1
(M jn ◦ Dˆn)ηj
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+
 q∑
j=1
(
λ1‖ηj‖2 + λ2‖ηj‖1
)
The sparse group LASSO introduces two tuning parameters, λ1 and λ2, to penalize both the l1 and
the l2 norm in each network. Similar to the LASSO estimator, the geometric shape of the penalties
allows the sparse group LASSO to identify sparsity not only within each network (group) but
also among networks (groups). In other words, some networks could be completely irrelevant (i.e.
ηj = 0) and within relevant networks, some individuals can have no influence on their neighbors
(i.e. ηj 6= 0 but ηji = 0 for some i).
de-bias 2SLSS Estimator under Multiple Networks:
eˆM = ηˆM + ΘˆZZ˜ ′nZˆ ′nWn(Dn − ZnηˆM )/n
bˆM = βˆ − (Xn − Znγˆβ)
′(Zˆn − ZnηˆM )
(Xn − Znγˆβ)′Xn
βˆ and ηˆM0 = (ηˆ
1′ , ηˆ2
′
, · · · , ηˆq′)′ are estimators from the 2SLSS estimator with multiple networks. Let
Zˆn =
[
(M1n ◦ Dˆn), (M2n ◦ Dˆn), · · · (M qn ◦ Dˆn)
]
, Zn =
[
(M1n ◦Dn), (M2n ◦Dn), · · · (M qn ◦Dn)
]
. Define
Z˜n = 1nZ ′nWnZˆn, ΘˆZ are defined by the nodewise regression as in Meinshausen and Bu¨hlmann
(2006) on Z˜n and γˆβ are again defined by the nodewise regression on between Xn and Zn.
Theorem 3. Under assumption 1*, assumption 2* and assumption 4-1*. There exists constant
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d1, d2, d3 and ι : ‖ι‖0 <∞ such that for the first stage tuning parameter λ1,1 ≥ 2
√
4σ2d1Λ
−2
min(logn+log q)
n
and second stage tuning parameter λ2,1 ≥ 2
√
4σ2d3Λ
−2
min(logn+log q)
n + 2d2λ1,1 + 2d3λ1,1, the de-bias
estimators
√
n(ι′eˆM − ι′ηM0 ) =
1√
n
ι′ΘˆZZ˜ ′n− ι′∆M ∼ N(0, σ2ι′ΘˆZZ˜ ′nΩmn Z˜nΘˆ′Zι)
√
n(bˆM − β0) = (Xn − Znγˆβ)
′
(Xn − Znγˆβ)′Xn + ∆M,β ∼ N
0, σ2 (Xn − Znγˆβ)′(Xn − Znγˆβ)(
(Xn − Znγˆβ)′Xn
)2

where ‖∆M‖∞ = op(1), ‖∆M,β‖∞ = op(1) and Z˜n = 1nZ ′nWnZˆn and Ωmn = 1n Zˆ ′nWnZˆn. ΘˆZ are
defined by the nodewise regression on Z˜n and γˆβ are defined by the nodewise regression on between
Xn and Zn.
Theorem 3 requires the rate of convergence for sparse group LASSO at the first stage. This is
proved in Lemma ?? in the appendix. In group LASSO, λ2,1 controls the convergence of the l2-
norm and thus it might be tempting to set it larger than λ1,1 to achieve l2 convergence. However,
group LASSO requires the number of regressors in each group to be finite. In my estimator, the
number of regressors in each group equals to n. In the next theorem, I show that λ2,1 will need to
be chosen in the same order as λ1,1 in order to achieve consistent selection.
Theorem 4. Let c˜ =
λ2,1
λ2,2
and ϑ˜mul1 =
1+ϑmul1
1−ϑmul1
. Choose λ2,1 and λ2,2 such that c˜ >
ϑmul1
1−ϑmul1
. Under
assumption 1*-4* and for λ2,1 ≥ 4(γ˜ ∨ ϑ˜mul1 )
√
σ2d3Λ
−2
min(logn+log q)
n + 2d2λ1,1 + 2d3λ1,1, there exists
γ˜ > 1,
lim
n→∞P(Sˆn = S) = 1
It is worth pointing out that assumption ?? is a weaker assumption than assume the full irrepre-
sentable condition on the design matrix
Σmul :=
1
n
[M1n,M
2
n, · · · ,M qn]′Wn[M1n,M2n, · · · ,M qn]
As the number of regressors in each group also goes to infinity as the number of groups goes
to infinity, the multicollinearity in Σmul can be severe. Instead, assumption ?? decomposes the
multicollinearity into between-group and within-group and thus allows a more flexible dependence
structure. As a result, sparse group LASSO can be used to recover the influential individuals as
well as the effective networks that generate spillovers.
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5 Simulations
In this section, I report Monte Carlo simulation results for the models proposed above. My results
are robust when applied to networks generated by different algorithms and to networks of different
sizes.
5.1 Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model
First, I use the Erdos-Renyi algorithm to simulate a network of size n. Individuals are added into
the graph one at a time. When one individual is added to the network, she has probability p of
generating a link with all existing individuals independently. I choose p = 0.1 and p = 0.2 in the
simulation. I avoid a large p because collinearity among regressors may arise when links become
very dense, violating assumption 3 or 4.
I set the first 5 individuals to be influential by letting their coefficients ηj be non-zero. To guarantee
the existence of endogenous effects, I arbitrarily specify the connections among these five individ-
uals. The adjacency matrix Mn for the five influential individuals is given in the appendix. If the
connections among these five individuals are not fixed, there is a possibility that no connections are
formed among these five and thus there is no endogeneity in the network. The results will be too
good in such a case. The true parameters are fixed as β0 = 3, η0,1 = η0,2 = η0,3 = η0,4 = η0,5 = 0.5,
and η0,j = 0 for j > 5. Individual characteristics Xn are generated from a standard normal distri-
bution. Individual outcomes Yn are then generated as Yn = (I −Mn ◦ η0)−1(Xnβ0 + n) where n
is drawn independently from a standard normal distribution.
I use (Mn, Xn, Yn) as observations and apply my two-stage LASSO estimator. I construct the de-
bias 2SLSS estimator and repeat the above process 200 times in a manner similar to van de Geer
et al. (2014). I report the average coverage probability (Avgcov) and average length (Avglength)
of confidence intervals for the coefficients for influential individuals, {η1, · · · , η5}, the coefficient for
individual characteristics, β0, and the coefficients for non-influential individuals, the ηjs (j > 5).
For example:
Avgcov S0 = s
−1
0
∑
j∈S0
P[η0,j ∈ CIj ] (16)
Avglength S0 = s
−1
0
∑
j∈S0
length(CIj) (17)
I separately report the average coverage and average length for each of the five influential individ-
uals. As shown in appendix table A1, the coverage is around the nominal 95% level and the length
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of the confidence intervals decreases as the sample size grows.
Since we can construct confidence intervals for all n coefficients, joint inference can be performed
under the control of False Discover Rate (FDR). As shown in equation (18), the power reported
in appendix table A1 represents the average percentage in the active set (i.e. {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) that
is significant after controlling for the False Discover Rate (FDR) at 5% using the Benjamini-
Hochberg method. The FDR reported in appendix table A1 represents the average percentage of
the non-active set (i.e. {6, 7, · · · , n}) that is significant after controlling the FDR at 5% using the
Benjamini-Hochberg method. The exact definition is as in equation (19).
Power = s−10
∑
j∈S0
P[H0,j is rejected] (18)
FDR =
∑
j∈Sc0
P[H0,j is rejected]/
n∑
j=1
P[H0,j is rejected] (19)
The power varies because the networks change when the sample size increases. It is strictly in-
creasing when the network is sparse (i.e. p = 0.1). The power decreases in the p = 0.2 case as
the problem of endogeneity increases when the network is dense. The empirical FDR is controlled
well, which all under the 5% rate. Notice that the confidence interval’s length is large when the
sample size equals 50. This is because when the number of individuals is small, some individuals
might only connect to 1 or 2 other individuals. This means that the regressors that represent this
individual are all 0s except for a small numbers of non-zero terms, which leads to a large standard
error.
The two-stage LASSO estimator requires the choice of two tuning parameters (i.e. the two λs
from both stages as in section 4.1). Moreover, when calculating Θˆ in the de-bias 2SLSS estimator
(section 4.2) and using the nodewise regression, one also need to choose a tuning parameter. I use
a benchmark choice of λnodewise &
√
log(n)/n and λ1 &
√
log(n)/n in the nodewise regression and
first stage. Then I use cross-validation to pick λ in the second stage.
I further increase the number of influential individuals to 10 and report the results in appendix
table A2. Again, to guarantee the existence of endogeneity, the adjacency matrix for these ten
individuals is set as shown in the appendix. All average coverages and average confidence interval
lengths are separately reported for these ten individuals. The choice of the tuning parameters is
similar to those used to generate appendix table A1 for networks with 50 and 200 individuals. For
networks with 500 individuals, I use benchmark λ to replace cross validation in the second stage.
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As shown in appendix table A2, all coverages are very close to the nominal levels. The average
lengths of confidence intervals is slightly larger compared with appendix table A1. This is due to
the increase in influential individuals; it is more difficult to differentiate them from those irrelevant
individuals.
Appendix table A3 presents the result when a network is generated using the Watts-Strogatz
mechanism or the “small world” network. Define the pN (even number) as the mean degree for
each node and a special parameter ω = 0.4. The WattsStrogatz mechanism works as follows:
- construct a graph with N nodes each connected to pN neighbors, which pN2 on each side.
- For each node ni, take every edge (ni, nj) with i < j and rewrite it with probability ω.
Rewrite means replace (ni, nj) with (ni, nk) where k is choosing uniformly among all nodes
that are not currently connected with ni
The influential individuals are chosen as the 1st, 5th, 15th, 40th and 50th individuals in the network.
As shown in appendix table A3, my estimator is robust under a “small world” algorithm. Nominal
level is reached as the size of the network grows and the length of confidence intervals is slightly
smaller than in the standard case.
5.2 Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Cliques
Appendix table A5 presents results for the heterogeneous endogenous effects model with cliques.
The outcome variable Yn is now generated as Yn = (I − Mn ◦ η0 − Mnγ0)−1(Xnβ0 + n). The
coefficient of the homogeneity effects γ0 is set at 0.05.
The choice of the tuning parameters is similar to that used to generate appendix table A1 for
networks with 50 and 200 individuals. For networks with 500 individuals, I use benchmark λ (i.e.
λ &
√
log(n)/n) to replace cross validation in the second stage.
The coverage is above the 95% nominal level in all cases. I also report the mean coverage and
average length of the confidence interval for the coefficient of the homogeneous effects. My model
gives above 95% coverage in all cases. I also report the empirical probability of rejecting a null
hypothesis of zeros effects at 95% nominal level. The probability of rejecting the test converges to
1 when the sample size grows to 500.
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5.3 Heterogeneous Endogenous Effects Model with Multiple Networks
In this Monte Carlo exercise, I include two different networks generated by the Erdos-Renyi algo-
rithm, where one is influential and the other is not. I use the two-stage LASSO estimator with
multiple networks to estimate the parameters. The sparse group LASSO requires two tuning pa-
rameters, one for the l2 norm and the other for the l1 norm. I set the two parameters to be equal
to each other as the correlations among the columns of the adjacency matrices are very small. The
choice of tuning parameters is similar to that used to generate appendix table A1 for networks
with 50 and 200 individuals. For networks with 500 individuals, I use benchmark λ instead of
cross-validation in the second stage. Appendix table A4 summarizes the results. As in previous
results, all coverages exceed the nominal 95% level.
I report the empirical probabilities such that at least one individual is detected in a given network
controlling for the FDR at 5% using the Benjamini-Hochberg method. I also report the average
number of detections conditioning on at least one individual who is detected in a given network.
Appendix table A4 shows that network 1, which is the relevant network, is more likely to be detected
in all cases than network 2, the irrelevant network. The average number of identified individuals
for network 1 is also more than that of network 2.
6 Empirical Application
I use the proposed estimator to study the importance of different networks in spreading the par-
ticipation in a micro finance program within rural Indian villages. I show that different kinds of
networks have different effects on individuals decisions. I identify the influential individuals in
each village. My analysis shows that leaders among agricultural laborers, Anganavadi teachers,
construction workers, small business owners and mechanics are very likely to be influential in the
villages.
6.1 Background
A non-profit organization named Bharatha Swamukti Samsthe (BSS) has been running micro fi-
nance programs in rural southern Karnataka, India since 2007. It provides small loan products
to poor women and, through them, to their families. The villages covered by the program are
geographically isolated and heterogeneous in terms of caste.
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When BSS initially introduces a micro finance program to a village, the credit officers of BSS first
approached a number of “predefined leaders”, such as teachers, shopkeepers and village elders.
BSS held a private meeting with these leaders and explained the program. Then these predefined
leaders passed the information onto other villagers. Those who were interested in the program
and contacted BSS were trained and assigned to groups to receive credit. Each group consisted
of 5 borrowers and group members were jointly liable for loans. Loans were around 10,000 rupees
(approximately $200) at an annualized rate of approximately 28%. Note that 74.5 percent of the
households in rural area said the monthly income of their highest earning member is less than 5,000
rupees (source: Socio-Economic Caste Census-2011). This loan had to be repaid within 50 weeks.
In 2006, 75 villages in Karnataka were surveyed 6 months before the initiation of the BSS micro
finance program. This survey consisted of a village questionnaire and a detailed follow-up survey
conducted among a subsample of villagers. The village questionnaire gathered demographic infor-
mation on all households in a village including GPS coordinates, age, gender, number of rooms,
whether the house had electricity, and whether the house had a latrine. The data set also con-
tains information on the “pre-defined leaders” set who helped spread the information to the entire
village. The follow-up survey collected data from a villager sample stratified according to age, ed-
ucation level, caste, occupancy, etc. It also asked questions about social network structures along
12 dimensions, including:
- Friends: Name the 4 non-relatives whom you speak to the most.
- Visit-go: In your free time, whose house do you visit?
- Visit-come: Who visits your house in his or her free time?
- Borrow-kerorice: If you needed to borrow kerosene or rice, to whom would you go?
- Lend-kerorice: Who would come to you if he/she needed to borrow kerosene or rice?
- Borrow-money: If you suddenly needed to borrow Rs. 50 for a day, whom would you ask?
- Lend-money: Who do you trust enough that if he/she needed to borrow Rs. 50 for a day you
would lend it to him/her?
- Advice-come: Who comes to you for advice?
- Advice-go: If you had to make a difficult personal decision, whom would you ask for advice?
- Medical-help: If you had a medical emergency and were alone at home whom would you ask
for help in getting to a hospital?
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- Relatives: Name any close relatives, aside from those in this household, who also live in this
village.
- Temple-company: Do you visit a temple/mosque/church? Do you go with anyone else? What
are the names of these people?
For the 43 villages where micro finance was introduced by the time of 2011, BSS also collects infor-
mation on which villagers have joined the program. These survey questions reveal the underlying
structures for connections among any two individuals in the network. Figure 5 presents all those
connections at the household-level in a graph. Each node in the graph represents a household.
A black node indicates that the household joined the micro finance program, while a white node
indicates that it did not. Bigger nodes represent those households in which at least one family
member has been chosen as being among the “pre-defined leaders”. An edge between two nodes
signifies that the two nodes are connected in at least one of the 12 networks. The darker the color
of the edge, the more connections it represents.
This dataset provides an ideal framework for application of the heterogeneous endogenous effects
model. First, it allows me to model endogenous effects. An individual may decide to join the
micro finance program if her neighbors or friends plan to join. Second, the endogenous effects are
individual specific. Given the diversity of the villagers, it is possible that some villagers are more
influential than others. Third, it allows me to implement the heterogeneous endogenous effects
model with multiple networks. The questions asked regarding multiple dimensions of the network
structure allow me to explore which network is most influential.
6.2 Data
In this empirical study, I focus on the 38 villages that have been introduced to the micro finance
programs by BSS. For each village, I can observe both its social network structure and the villagers’
decisions about joining the program. I drop the data for one village (Village 46) that contains
incorrect entries on the index of households. Appendix table ?? summarizes the descriptive statistics
for each village.
Among the 12 questions about the social network structure, 4 pairs essentially capture the same
connections among the villagers 2. Therefore, I consolidate each pair of questions into one dimen-
sion:
2Assuming every villager truthfully answers a pair of questions, the adjacency matrices associated with each
question are the same. It is also plausible to treat villagers’ answers to each question as a separate directed graph.
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Figure 5: Network in Village 1
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Visit-go-come
In your free time, whose house do you visit?Who visits your house in his or her free time?
Borrow-Lend-kerorice
If you needed to borrow kerosene or rice, to whom would you go?Who would come to you if he/she needed to borrow kerosene or rice?
Borrow-Lend-money

If you needed to borrow Rs.50 for a day, whom would you ask?
Who do you trust enough that if he/she needed to borrow Rs.50 for a
day you would lend it to him/her?
Help decision

Who comes to you for advice?
If you had to make a difficult personal decision, whom would you ask
for advice?
I restructure all the data at the household level as only women are allowed to apply for the micro
finance program because the goal of BSS is to support families through the women in them. As
a result, a woman’s decision to join or not join the micro finance program becomes her family’s
decision. A connection between two villagers becomes a connection between two families. A
“predefined leader” is a villager selected by BSS to help spread information about the micro finance
program to the other villagers. At the household level, I use the term “predefined leader” for a
household that contains at least one such villager.
6.3 Sparsity and Equilibrium
To demonstrate how my method identifies influential households, I model families’ decisions regard-
ing joining the micro finance program as a network game with Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For
household i, let d∗i be the expected probability that i chooses to join the micro finance program.
The decision of household i depends on its neighbors’ decisions as well as the types of connections
between them. The decision also depends on its characteristics Xi and on unobserved information
i. Formally, it can be written as:
d∗i =
∑
l∈Ni
d∗l (
q∑
j=1
ηjl ) + xiβ + i
However, these questions do not allow for clear determination of the directions. For example, if villager A visits
villager B’s house, it is not clear whether villager A influences villager B or vice versa
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Rewritten in matrix form:
D∗n =
q∑
j=1
(
M jn ◦D∗n
)
ηj +Xnβ + n
I assume that only a small number of households are influential over their neighbors. Leaders and
followers are usually observed in those rural villages. Big decisions are often made by the village
elders or by the more educated among the villagers. BSS recognized the importance of leaders
and gathered a group of predefined leaders, asking them to inform the rest of the villagers about
their program. I do not consider the local level influence in these villages given the size and how
complicated the network structures are. Households are closely connected by these 8 networks as
shown in Figure 5 and there is no form of clique visible.
Because the villages are considered geographically isolated, I apply my estimator separately to
each of the 38 villages. I use the number of rooms per person in a household as the independent
variable Xn. Number of rooms per person is a proxy for the wealth in the family. As shown
in table 1, it is negatively correlated with the decision to join the micro finance program. The
richer the family, the less likely the family is to participate in the micro-finance program. On
the other hand, it is arguably an exogenous variable to other factors (career, education, etc) that
might affect the decision to join the micro-finance program. I further check the robustness of my
independent variable by including additional controls. The adjacency matrix M jn is constructed
from the questions in the survey. Households i and k are connected in network j if either i or k
reported the other in question j. Finally, d∗i is replaced with the household’s decision.
The instruments are constructed as
(
M jn ◦Xn
)
for j = 1, 2, · · · , 8. I use the heterogeneous en-
dogenous effects model with multiple networks to: 1) Identify the effective networks affecting a
household’s decision and 2) Identify that households that are leaders in the village and study the
association between observable characteristics and leader status. If a new program is going to try to
recruit these households, the organizers can target those influential households and try to persuade
them to join first.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Identifying Effective Networks
First, I study how LASSO selects networks. I define a coefficient for a household’s endogenous effect
in a network as significant according to two different criteria. The first criterion, “Cross-Validation”,
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Table 1: Predictive Power of Characteristics Xn
(1) (2) (3)
Participate Participate Participate
Average Num. rooms x100 -8.19∗∗∗ -7.12∗∗∗ -3.36∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.30) (1.12)
Household Size x100 0.45∗∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.21) (0.20)
Electricity x100 1.29
(1.26)
Latrine x100 -5.66∗∗∗
(1.38)
Average Num. workers x100 0.64∗
(0.50)
Average age x100 -0.27∗∗∗
(0.03)
Village Fixed Effects Y Y Y
n 8,375 8,375 8,375
# of villages 37 37 37
R2 0.05 0.05 0.06
Table 1 provides a robustness check for variable Xn: Average Num. rooms, which used to construct instruments. Standard
errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard deviation clustered at village level. Dependent variable is
households’ decision on whether to join the micro finance program or not. All design control village fixed effects.
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determines a coefficient to be significant if LASSO predicts the coefficient to be non-zero after
cross-validation. The second criterion, “de-bias”, first constructs a bias-adjusted coefficient and
calculates its standard error. It then determines a coefficient to be significant if the Benjamini-
Hochberg method rejects the null hypothesis of zero effect at the 5% false discovery rate. A network
is defined as significant if at least one coefficient for heterogeneous endogenous effects in this network
is significant.
Table 2 presents the empirical probability of the 8 networks being significant among the 37 villages.
Note that certain types of networks (such as visit go-come) are more likely to pass influence then
others (such as temple company). For example, by cross-validation criterion, the visit go-come
network is detected as significant in 26 out of the 37 villages (i.e. 70%) whereas temple company
is detected as significant in none of the 37 villages (i.e. 0%). I also present the average number of
households associated with significant endogenous effects in each significant network. For example,
according to the cross-validation criterion, an average of 101 households are detected having sig-
nificant coefficients associated with the visit go-come network among the 26 village. The average
of the absolute magnitude of the heterogeneous endogenous effects is also reported.
In terms of variable selection, if Assumption 4 holds, the cross-validation criterion may consistently
select the truly influential households with high probability even in a finite sample. On the other
hand, the de-bias criterion is likely to be conservative because of its use of the false discovery control
process. In terms of coefficients estimated, de-bias estimators are asymptotically consistent. On
the other hand, estimates based on the LASSO estimator suffer from shrinkage bias and are not
consistent.
Table 2: Influential Networks
visit friendship borrow-lend borrow-lend relatives help medical temple
go-come keroric money decision help company
Cross 1 probability 3 70% 54% 38% 49% 22% 30% 14% 0%
Validation identified 4 101 89 88 86 69 70 80 0
De-bias 2
probability 3 54% 35% 30% 19% 16% 8% 5% 0%
identified 4 11 8 8 9 7 14 8 0
magnitudes 5 0.0166 0.0095 0.0070 0.0061 0.0050 0.0040 0.0028 0.0018
Table 2 reports the probability of detection for different networks among the 38 villages. A network is detected as influential if
at least one leader is detected within this network. 1. Cross Validation represents those networks detected by lasso using cross
validation. 2. De-bias represents those networks detected by significant de-bias estimators under FDR control. 3. Probability
reports the empirical probability that at least one coefficient eˆji is significant in network j. 4. Identified reports the averaged
number of significant eˆji in the network j conditioning on the network being detected. 5. Magnitudes is the mean of |eˆji | and
represents the average endogenous effects through network j
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The results in Table 2 suggest villagers are more likely to discuss the micro-finance program when
they visit each other, chat with friends, and meet with people to whom they are economically
connected. Villagers are not likely to talk about the micro finance program when they go to the
temple or need medical help.
6.4.2 Identifying Influential Households
Second, I focus on how LASSO selects households. I compare the LASSO selected influential
households with the BSS selected “predefined leaders”. It is important to point out that these
“predefined leaders” are not necessarily influential villagers in a network. Recall that predefined
leaders are a set of villagers that BSS select to help spread the information about the micro finance
program. The fact that a villager is selected as a “predefined leader” to pass information about
the micro finance program does not a priori guarantee her or her family’s influence – her decision
to join the micro finance program may not lead to her neighbors’ decisions to join. In the analyses
below, I will examine how influential villagers are associated with “predefined leaders” and explore
their potential differences.
1. Influential Predefined Households
In table 3, I report results indicating that influential households selected by LASSO partly overlap
with “predefined leaders”. This is intuitive because some “predefined leaders” such as school
headmasters and village elders are highly respected figures in a village. Therefore, their decisions
are likely to be followed by others in the village. On average, BSS selected 27 villagers as “predefined
leaders” in each village. In comparison, Cross-Validation criterion selects around 136 villagers and
de-bias criterion selects around 19. Furthermore, on average, 19 out of 136 influential villagers (i.e.
14%) selected by Cross-Validation criterion are also BSS “predefined leaders”; 3 out of 19 influential
villagers (i.e. 17%) selected by de-bias criterion are also BSS “predefined leaders”. The likelihood
of selected by the two methods are both higher than the percentage of predefined leaders in the
entire village (11%). Comparing with a random guess of influential individuals, table 3 suggests the
LASSO detected influential individuals are more likely to overlap with the predefined leaders. In
Table 6 below, I show that small business owners are more likely to be both influential and selected
as “predefined leaders”.
2. Influential Non-Predefined Households
In this and the following section, I focus on understanding the differences between the influential
households selected by LASSO and the “predefined households” selected by BSS. I investigate the
likelihood that a household being selected by LASSO or by BSS, as associated with the careers of
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Table 3: Coverage of predefined leaders
% of predefined leaders among:
Average number of discovery 3
LASSO detected 1 entire village 2
Cross Validation 4 14% 11% 136
De-bias 5 17% 11% 19
Table 3 depicts the overlapping between influential households selected by LASSO and “predefined leaders”. Predefined leaders
are a set of villagers defined by BSS, who helped spread the information about the micro-finance program. 1. LASSO detected
reports the percentage of households detected by LASSO and also selected as “predefined leaders” in total LASSO detected
households. 2. Entire village reports the percentage of “predefined leaders” among the entire village. 3. Average number of
discovery reports the total number of individuals discovered by LASSO using each method. 4. Cross Validation represents
those individuals identified from lasso using cross validation. 5. De-bias represents those individuals identified from significant
de-biased estimators controlling FDR. 6. The average number of predefined leaders in one village is 27.
its family members. Table 4 and 5 present linear regression results using career dummy variables
of family members to explain whether a household is selected as “predefined leader” (Column 1 in
table 4), whether a household is selected by LASSO as influential using cross-validation (Column
2 in table 4), and whether a household is selected by LASSO as influential using de-bias estimator
(Column 3 in table 4). The full results of these regressions are reported in appendix table A7.
Table 4 summarizes all careers that have a significant impact (p < 0.001) on the likelihood of a
household being selected by LASSO as influential using de-bias method. Agriculture is the back-
bone of those rural villages and over 67% of the villagers are agricultural laborers. The prior that
there exists influential individuals among agricultural laborers coincides with the LASSO detection.
Anganwadi teacher is a set of groups that provides pre-school education to the children. They are
part of the government’s health care system in the rural areas. Note that except for small business
owners and Anganavadi teacher all the other careers in this table are either not significantly or
negatively associated with the likelihood of a household being selected as “predefined leaders”.
Compare with Anganavadi teacher and small business owners, regular teachers and animal skin
business owners are not targeted by BSS as “predefined leaders” but LASSO estimators indicate
they may also become influential. Other careers that are correlated with LASSO selection include
construction/mud worker, truck/tractor driver, factory worker, daily labor and wood cutter. In-
dustrial workers are likely to form circles of collaboration due to the natural of their jobs and thus
it seems compelling that they are selected as influential individuals.
Table 5 summarizes all careers that have a significant impact (p < 0.01) on the likelihood of a
household being selected by BSS as being among the “predefined leaders”. Poojari are Indian
priests in those villages and they are very likely to be included as “predefined leaders”. However,
they are not likely to influence people to join the micro finance program. Other careers as tailor,
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hotel workers, veteran and barber are included as “predefined leaders” because individuals doing
these jobs can spread information quickly in the village. However, LASSO does not find these
individuals to be influential.
Table 6 reports the counter factual study when selected leaders all decide to join the micro-finance
program. The participation rate for non-leaders in the data is 16%. When all “predefined leaders”
decide to join, the participation rate for non-leaders will increase to 20%. And when all LASSO
selected leaders decide to join, the participation rate for non-leaders will further increase to 33%.
Table 4: Second Stage: LASSO selected leaders’ careers
Predefined Selected by LASSO
leaders Cross-validation De-bias
Agriculture labour 0.00 0.31∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Anganavadi Teacher 0.14∗ 0.11 0.13∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Construction/mud worker 0.00 0.17∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Truck/Tractor Driver -0.03 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Factory worker (bricks/stones/mill) -0.00 0.17∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Small business 0.22∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Teacher 0.05 0.22∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Daily labourer -0.05∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Wood cutter -0.03 0.15∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
Animal skin business 0.36 0.62∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.28) (0.15)
Control other careers Y Y Y
Control village fix effect Y Y Y
Table 4 summarizes all careers that have a significant impact (p < 0.001) on the likelihood of a household being selected by
LASSO de-bias method from appendix table ??. The first column uses whether one is predefined leaders as response variable,
the second column uses whether one joins the micro-finance program as response variable and the third column uses whether
one is selected by lasso as response variable. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
40
Table 5: Second Stage: predefined leaders’ careers
Predefined Selected by LASSO
leaders Cross-validation De-bias
Small business 0.22∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Tailor Garment worker 0.08∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Hotel worker 0.32∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ -0.02
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Poojari 0.53∗∗∗ 0.15 -0.05
(0.13) (0.16) (0.09)
Veterinary clinic 0.87∗∗ -0.03 0.00
(0.32) (0.39) (0.21)
Barber/saloon 0.41∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
Control other careers Y Y Y
Control village fix effect Y Y Y
Table 5 summarizes all careers that have a significant impact ((p < 0.01)) on the likelihood of a household being selected by
BSS as being among the “predefined leaders” from appendix table ??. The first column uses whether one is predefined leaders
as response variable, the second column uses whether one joins the micro-finance program as response variable and the third
column uses whether one is selected by lasso as response variable. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
Table 6: Participation Rate when Targeting Different Leaders
In data
Predefined LASSO
Leaders Leaders
Participation Rate
16% 20% 33%
(non-leaders)
Table 6 reports the participation rate of non-leaders when all targeted leaders decided to join. The true participation rate in
data is 16%. If all predefined leaders decide to join, the participation rate will increase to 20%. If all LASSO detected leaders
decide to join, the participation rate will increase to 33%.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper, I propose a novel spatial autoregression model which allows for heterogeneous en-
dogenous effects. Specifically, each individual has an individual-specific endogenous effect on her
neighbors. My approach is useful for modeling a network with leaders and followers.
I propose a set of instruments as well as a two stage LASSO (2SLSS) method to estimate my model.
The instruments are constructed as a function of the independent variables and an adjacency matrix.
I use a LASSO type estimator to select the valid instruments in the first stage and the influential
individuals in the second stage. I propose a bias correction for my two-stage estimator following
van de Geer et al. (2014). I derive the asymptotic normality for my “de-bias” two-stage LASSO
estimator and conduct robust inference including confidence intervals.
My model can be extended to allow for more flexible structures. To apply LASSO, I assume that
the number of influential individuals is sparse. I propose heterogeneous endogenous effects model
with cliques to incorporate locally influential individuals, where the sparsity assumption is only
applied to globally influential individuals. My model can also be extended to situations where
there are multiple networks. I propose the use of the sparse group LASSO in my 2SLSS process.
I derive the convergence rate and prove the consistency of selection for the sparse group LASSO
estimator.
I apply my method to study villagers’ decisions to participate in micro-finance programs in rural
areas of Indian. I show that leaders in those villages have significant influence over their neighbors’
decision to join the micro-finance program, and I provide rankings for the different social and
economic networks among villagers. Based on how effectively each network spreads the impact of
influential individuals’ decisions, my method shows that some networks such as “visit go-come” and
“borrow money” are much more effective in influencing villagers’ decisions than other networks such
as “temple company” and “medical help”. I further show that individuals from certain careers such
as agricultural workers, Anganwadi teachers and small business owners are more likely to influence
other villagers and the “predefined leaders” selected by BSS are different than the LASSO detected
influential individuals.
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